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Abstract— Many embedded security chips require a high-
quality Random Number Generator (RNG). Unfortunately, hard-
ware RNG randomness can vary in time due to implementation
defects or certain kinds of attacks. To overcome this issue, this
paper presents the implementation of a battery of statistical test
for randomness. The battery is selected for its efficient imple-
mentation, making the area and power consumption insignificant.
Performance and cost of the hardware implementation are given
for FPGA and VLSI targets. Results show that statistical tests can
easily be implemented in low-cost embedded security circuits and
can enhance on-line monitoring of RNG randomness to prevent
RNG failures.
I. INTRODUCTION
The objective of a random number generator (RNG) is
to produce random binary numbers which are statistically
independent, uniformly distributed and unpredictable. RNGs
are necessary in many applications like cryptography, com-
munication, VLSI testing, probabilistic algorithms, and so
on. RNG randomness evaluation is performed by using a
battery of statistical tests. Several such batteries are reported
in the literature including Diehard [1], NIST [2], FIPS 140-
1, FIPS 140-2 [3] and the AIS 31 [4] batteries. They are all
implemented using high-level software programming. When
an RNG is evaluated, designers put a huge bit stream into
memory and then submit it to software tests. If the bit stream
successfully passes a certain number of statistical tests, the
RNG is said to be sufficiently random.
However, the number of hardware applications requiring
RNGs is continuously increasing, specially in embedded
circuits (e.g. Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) and
System-on-Chip). As a consequence, many applications need
an embedded RNG. Generally, a hybrid RNG comprising
a True Random Number Generator (TRNG) and a Pseudo
Random Number Generator (PRNG) is used. PRNGs are based
on deterministic algorithms. They are periodic, and must be
initialized by a TRNG. TRNGs are based on a physical noise
source (e.g. radioactive decay, thermal noise or free running
jitter oscillators) and depend strongly on their implementation
quality. Most of the TRNGs implemented in FPGA or ASIC
(Application-Specific Integrated Circuit) use phase jitter pro-
duced by a free running oscillator or a Phase-Locked Loop
(PLL). Jitter is the deviation of a signal from its ideal behavior.
Jitter is caused by deterministic noise (power supply noise,
cross-talk noise, pink noise) and by random noise (substrate
noise, temperature) and strongly depends on the oscillator
generator used in the TRNG (usually ring oscillator or PLL)
[5]. In practice, jitter can be influenced by noise external to the
FPGA (power supply noise, temperature) and by chip activity.
This dependence is a weakness exploitable by hackers. In
[6], the TRNG proposed in [7] was tested against an active
non-invasive attack. It was shown therein that the generator
randomness can vary by changing the temperature of the
FPGA chip. If the TRNG configuration is not correctly chosen,
the generator fails the statistical tests. In cryptography, security
is usually based on the randomness quality of a key generated
by an RNG. Some PRNGs are recognized to produce high
quality random numbers [8]. However, their quality depend
on TRNG seed randomness. Consequently, TRNG failures
must be prevented in real time for applications requiring a
high level of security. AIS 31 [4] defines a TRNG evaluation
methodology based on the use of 8 statistical tests. Depending
on the required randomness level, the TRNG noise source is
tested by the statistical tests when the generator is switch on
or/and during operation. As a result, the tests prevented TRNG
failures. The solution that we propose in this paper is on-chip
monitoring of the TRNG by using a hardware battery of four
statistical tests. In [9] the implementation of the four tests has
been realized for a targeted Xilinx Virtex 2 FPGA. However, as
presented in this paper, our design is more efficient. Moreover,
performance and cost of the hardware implementation are
given for FPGA and VLSI targets. Furthermore, in contrast
to [9], the paper is not only focused on test implementation.
After the design presentation, two recognized TRNGs are
evaluated by the on-chip monitoring in order to evaluate their
randomness quality.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the statisti-
cal tests selection and implementation is described. Then, the
relevance of the continuous TRNG monitoring is demonstrated
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in Section 3. Finally, conclusions and perspectives on the
TRNG on-chip monitoring are given.
II. STATISTICAL TESTS
A. Statistical test selection
Many batteries of statistical tests exist in the literature. The
most widely recognized batteries are Diehard [1] and NIST
[2]. These include 15 and 16 statistical tests respectively. The
AIS 31 is composed of 8 statistical tests. Hardware implemen-
tation of some algorithms in these batteries would consume too
much in terms of arithmetic and memory units. Consequently,
less demanding (in terms of hardware resources) statistical
tests must be chosen. Thus, four standard statistical tests were
selected for implementation: the frequency test, the poker
test, the run test and the long-run test. These tests analyze
a 2 × 104-bit stream. The tests provide explicit bounds that
the computed results must satisfy. If the binary stream fails
any of the tests, the generator is considered not truly random.
The tests were used in FIPS 140-1 and in FIPS 140-2 [3].
Moreover, they are currently included in AIS 31 [4]. Although
these tests are less powerful than the Diehard and NIST
batteries, the hardware implementation will be highly efficient.
As a result, the hardware tests will have a high operating
frequency allowing the analysis of a RNG in real-time to
prevent deviation from its ideal behavior.
B. Statistical test implementation
1) Frequency test: This test verifies that the 2 × 104-bit
stream is uniformly distributed. The bias of the sequence is
analyzed. The number of 1s (n1) is counted and must lie in
[9726, 10274].
2) Poker test: The bit stream is decomposed into four-bit
non-overlapping subsequences and 5 × 103 blocks are cre-
ated. The poker test verifies that subsequences are uniformly
distributed. Occurrences of the 16 possible subsequences are
counted. Let ni be the number of occurrences of the integer
i binary representation, with 0 ≤ i ≤ 15. The value of X2
given by
X2 =
24
5× 103
(
15∑
i=0
n2i
)
− 5× 103, (1)
follows a Chi-Square distribution with 15 degrees of freedom
and must lie in ]2.16; 46.17[ to pass the poker test.
In hardware, computing equation (1) is an area-consuming
task. An alternative is to compute the summation
∑15
i=0 n
2
i and
to compare the result with the required interval
]Ymin, Ymax[. In
∑15
i=0 n
2
i , the maximal value of a counter (ni)
must be computed as a function of the other counter values
(nj , j $= i). The optimization problem
max(ni) subject to
Ymin <
∑15
j=0 n
2
j < Ymax∑15
j=0 nj = 5× 103
nj ≥ 0, 0 ≤ j ≤ 15
(2)
i Required interval for n0i and n
1
i
1 2343-2657
3 1135-1365
3 542-708
4 251-373
5 111-201
≥ 6 111-201
TABLE I
RUN TEST REQUIRED INTERVAL.
Area (µm2) Power (mW ) Critical Path (ns)
29981.6 7.37 6.08 (164.47 MHz)
TABLE II
TOTAL AREA, TOTAL DYNAMIC POWER AND CRITICAL PATH IN 130 nm,
1.2V CMOS TECHNOLOGY.
must be solved and ni is maximal when
∑15
j=0,j !=i n
2
j is
minimal and the constraints are satisfied. The maximal value
of a counter max(ni) is 428. This optimization reduces the
counter bit width and the operator size in the Data-Flow Graph
(DFG) as only one 9× 9 multiplier and one 21-bit by 21-bit
adder are required.
3) Run test: The run test determines if the number of runs
of various lengths is as expected in a random sequence. Let
n1i and n0i be respectively the number of 1-runs (sequence
of consecutive 1s) and 0-runs (sequence of consecutive 0s)
of length i. For 1 ≤ i ≤ 6, n1i and n0i are counted. If the
occurrences satisfy Table I, the random sequence passes the
run test. Only twelve counters are required to memorize the
occurrence of each run.
4) Long run test: This test verifies that there are no runs
of length 26 or more, requiring only a 5-bit counter.
It has been shown in this section that the selected tests
need very few arithmetic and memory hardware resources.
Consequently, even if the four selected tests are less powerful
than a stringent battery such as Diehard, results show that these
tests provide a good trade-off between their ability to detect
TRNG weaknesses and hardware efficiency. As demonstrated
in the next section, the hardware tests will have a high
operating frequency allowing the analysis of a TRNG in real-
time to prevent deviation from its ideal behavior.
C. Implementation results
Statistical tests have been synthesized with the Synopsys
Design Compiler tool targeting 130 nm CMOS technology.
Table II summarizes the total area, the estimated dynamic
power and the critical path results of the battery hardware
implementation. Power results have been obtained with an
operating voltage of 1.2V. Then, the battery has been imple-
mented in a Xilinx Virtex 2 FPGA to compare the design with
[9] and in a Xilinx Virtex 5 FPGA. Table III shows the total
number of Look-Up Tables (LUT) and the design maximum
frequency. The maximal frequency obtained by [9] is 113 MHz
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targeted FPGA Xilinx Virtex 2 Xilinx Virtex 5
XC2V1000-6 XC5VLX50T-3
Total LUTs 626 (6%) 482 (1%)
Maximum 134.7 MHz 189.4 MHz
frequency (MHz)
TABLE III
BATTERY IMPLEMENTATION RESULTS IN XILINX VIRTEX 2 AND VIRTEX 5
FPGAS.
and is consequently inferior than the frequency of our design.
Tables II and III show that implementation is extremely
efficient and needs few logic resource, suggesting that such
batteries can be easily implemented into low-cost embedded
circuits. Moreover, the operating frequency is high, making
possible to test the high data rate TRNG noise source in real-
time.
After the presentation of the statistical test selection and
implementation, their interest in TRNG evaluation is presented
in the next section.
III. TRNG RANDOMNESS EVALUATION
To show the TRNG on-chip monitoring interest, two rec-
ognized TRNGs are tested against temperature attacks, in
real time using the proposed hardware statistical tests. These
TRNGs have been chosen because they are well documented
and they can be implemented in FPGA circuits. The first
TRNG is based on sampling the phase jitter in a ring oscillator
and a model to compute the number of ring oscillators satisfy-
ing a given randomness level. Figure 1 presents the principle
of the TRNG [10]. Since the number of ring oscillators is too
high, the actual number of oscillators implemented is reduced
and a post-processing unit is added to correct the bias produced
by the generator. It was shown in [10] that 114 ring oscillators
of 13 inverters are necessary to have a secure TRNG. The post-
processing unit is a [256, 16, 113] BCH code used as a resilient
function.
Ring Oscillator 1
D Q
Clk
Resilient function
Post-processing
Output
Ring Oscillator 2
Ring Oscillator 114
Fig. 1. Oscillator sampling proposed in [10].
Authors of [11] have described a TRNG based on [10] with
reduced numbers of ring oscillators and inverters (110 ring
oscillators of 3 inverters). Therefore, the TRNG presented in
[11] is considered as the first tested TRNG. The frequency of
the CLK signal in Figure 1 is taken equal to 40 MHz. As a
result, the TRNG data rate is 2.5 Mb/s.
The second TRNG has been presented in [7]. Figure 2 gives
the principle of the generator. One clock signal is sampled by
FPGA Fischer Schellekens
Temperature (◦C) and al. [7] and al. [11]
30 79 100
50 86.9 100
70 91.3 100
90 99.7 100
110 99.7 100
130 99.7 99.8
TABLE IV
SUCCESS PERCENTAGES (%) OF THE TWO TESTED TRNGS AS A
FUNCTION OF THE FPGA TEMPERATURE (◦C).
another clock signal. The two clocks are generated using two
PLLs. A simple XOR extractor is required to reduce the bias
of the output bit stream. The principle is to perform a XOR
on KD successive bits of the output bit stream. In [7], the
TRNG is implemented with KD = 203 and the following PLL
parameters, MCLK/DCLK = 29/10, MCLJ/DCLJ = 27/7.
PLL D Q
CLI XOR 
Extractor
Output
PLL
CLJ
CLK
Fig. 2. Oscillator sampling proposed in [7].
Each TRNG is implemented in an Altera Stratix DSP board
with an EP1S25 FPGA. Table IV gives the percentage of
success for the two TRNGs tested when they are submitted
to 1 × 103 statistical test realizations. On each realization
the TRNG is declared truly random when the four tests are
satisfied. If one test is not succeeded by the TRNG, the
analyzed sequence is rejected. These measures are realized
when the FPGA temperature is varying from 30 to 130◦C.
The recommended operating FPGA temperature is between
0 to 55◦C. In order to show the dependance between TRNG
behavior and its environment, the FPGA has been intentionally
heated upper than 55◦C. As presented in Table IV, the test
success percentage is not always equal to 100%. At tem-
perature below than 90◦C, the second TRNG [7] presents
some deficient random bit streams. However, by increasing
the FPGA temperature, TRNG [7] randomness quality is
improving. On the contrary, the on-line statistical test has a
small efficiency on TRNG [11]. At 130◦C, the tests filter only
two bit streams on the 1 × 103 analyzed. According to the
experiment, Table IV allows to conclude that TRNG [11] has
a better randomness than the TRNG [7].
For TRNG [7], Figure 3 presents the test efficiency on the
bit stream filtered by the tests. When the FPGA temperature is
less or equal to 90◦C, the TRNG defects are almost all detected
by the frequency test. At 110◦C, the run test and the poker
test discern the generator failures while the frequency test is
totally inefficient. Finally, at 130◦C, the TRNG weaknesses
are discovered by the run and the frequency test. This study
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shows that the frequency test, the poker test and the run test
should be preferred in order to monitor the TRNG [7].
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Fig. 3. Test efficiency in percent (%) on TRNG [7] as a function of the
FPGA temperature (◦C).
To show the benefit of the on-line monitoring on TRNG
[7], the 8-bit entropy is computed for the bit stream produced
by the generator (X) and the same sequence filtered by the
tests (Xfiltered). Results for FPGA temperature between 30◦C
to 130◦C are reported in Figure 4. As shown, for temperature
less than 90 ◦C, the on-line monitoring improves the bit stream
entropy and demonstrates the methodology benefit.
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Fig. 4. Entropy computation as a function of the FPGA temperature (◦C).
The experiments showed that TRNGs are sensitive to their
environment such as temperature variations. However, the
on-line monitoring allows to filter cases in which TRNGs
are presenting some weaknesses. Consequently, even if the
targeted device is used in an inappropriate environment, the
design is able to improve the bit stream randomness.
IV. CONCLUSION
After the selection of an efficient battery of statistical tests,
this paper presented its optimized hardware implementation.
Each test has been studied to minimize the resources re-
quired by the design. Implementation results have been given
for FPGA and VLSI targets. Implementation is extremely
efficient, suggesting that such batteries can be implemented
into low-cost embedded circuits. Using hardware statistical
tests in secure circuits allows on-line monitoring of random
number generator and to detect defects due to implementation
quality, various types of attacks, and environment variations.
The methodology improves the randomness quality of the bit
stream produced by the TRNG [7]. Moreover, after having
study the statistical test efficiency to detect TRNG weaknesses,
the battery can be reduced to three tests, the frequency, the
poker and the run test. The implementation is very useful
for RNG designers, and considerably simplifies the random-
ness evaluation, a time-consuming task when using high-
level software statistical tests. In futur works, more stringent
tests will be added to the four statistical tests. As a result,
TRNG weaknesses could be detected more efficiently. Then,
the experiments will be extended to other recognized TRNGs,
such as the generator described in [12] and [13].
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